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Equilibrium".Abstract
In this paper a mude] of arbitrage in a pure exchange economy with price-
setting agents is given. A hierazchically structured trade economy is defined
in whiclt a hierarchical relation between twu agents is assumed tu have the
institutiunal characteristics of a monopolistic relation between the dominating
and the durrtinated agent.
Wt~ assume agents can only ubserve their closest followers in the hierarchical
structure. 'I'his situation is described by the local infurmation structure. '1'he
agents fornt their conjectures about the consequences of their actions on the
basis of their lintited knuwledge of (t}te state of) the economy.
Wt~ derive a theorem un the existence uf eyuilibrium which states that if
Llle hierarchical structure is sufFiciently rich to allow fur enuugh possibilities
f~~r arbil.rage, Lhen equilibriulu t'XISLs Rlld eacó t~yuilibrium is wliforlnly priced.
I~'urthermore, in eyuilibrium agents that do nuL have a direct superior in the
hicrarrhical structure tnay find thentselves being rationed.
We prove a theorem which states that the Walrasian auctioneer can be
replaced by a monopolist with neglectable initial endowments. This theurem
is then used tu pruve a theorem on Walrasian equivalence.1 Introduction
The general equilibrium model, as introduced by Walras (1874) and formulated by
Arruw and Debreu (1954) and Debreu (1959), is one uf the fundamental models
in econorrrics. It is a model in which decentralized selfish decision making leads to
outcunres which are efficient for the economy as a whole, as is stated in the First
Theurem oí Welíare Economics. Unfortunately the model has some weaknesses, two
of which will be mentioned here. Firstly, all agents in the economy are assumed to
act as price takers, without any agent setting the prices. Secondly it is assumed
that each agent can trade with every other agent in the economy only through "the
rnarket", su a very particular trade or curnrnunication structure of the ec.unomy is
assumed. In this paper we develop models that aim to tackle both of these problem.
The problem of modelling price setting agents in general equilibrium mudels
has occupied ec~nomists fr,r some time and it continues to du so. We refer to
Ncgishi (19fi1 ), Arruw aud Ilahn (1971) and Marschak aud SclLcn ( I979), all uf
whum analyr,ed ~;c~neral equilibrium rnucíel5 with rnunopulistic cumpetition. More
recently li.uberts (1987), Kamiya (1988), a.nd Selten and Wuoders (1990) used rnure
sophisticated institutional procedures to model price setting agents. Roberts (1987)
incorporated rationing in his model, Kamiya (1988) investigated pricing rules and
Selten and Wuoders (1990) used a dynamic bargaining model to describe a process
of price formation.
Models with restricted cummunication structures have facussed on spatial eco-
nurnics and theuries on interrnediaries. In Karmann (1981) a spatial general equilib-
riunr mudel is given in which transporation technologies play an important róle. In
Grudal and Vind (1989) markets are modelled as exchange institutions with prices.
Other mudels on intermediaries are mostly partial equilibrium models. We refer to
Machup and Taber (1960) and Krelle (1976) for models of successive monopolies
and vertical integration. More recently Gehrig (1990) introduced a model in which
networks uf intermediaries in markets with restricted communication, give rise to
endogenous product differentiation.
As in Gilles (1990) and Spanjers et al. (1991a,b} our goal is to use a hierarchi-
cal structure of a finite economy to build a model with price setting agents. The
leader in a hierarchical relation is assumed to behave as a price setter, the follower
is assumed to act as a price taker with respect to this relation. In the model of
1Gilles (1990) assumptions on the possibilities for retrade are essential. A theo-
rem un thc ~xistencc uf equilibrium is pruved through equivalencc with Walrasian
equilibrium.
In describing the behaviour of econornic agents it seems appropriate to make
explicit what an agent anticipates to be the consequences of (a change in) his
actiuns. In Negishi (1961) it is assummed that a firm anticipates the demand for the
curnmudity he pruduces to be a linear function of the current state of the economy
and of the prices he charges. In Hahn (1978) and Gale (1978) the conjectures of
the agents are functions which for each combination of market signals an agent
receives and actions he rnight take, gives the vector of rnarket prices he anticipates
tu result. In this context attention is focussed on Walrasian and non-Walrasian
eyuilibria. In Vind (1983) the concept of conjectures is generalized through the
model of equilibrium with coordination. Once again the conjectures, nuw called
expectations, are exogenously given functions, although Vind does provide a simple
example in whieh the expectations functiuns are derived from the set uf exchange
institutions in the economy.
ln Spanjers et al. (1991a,b) the importance of the conjectures of the agents
for uur type oí mudel is recognized. The conjectures are assumed to depend on
the "transparency" of the economy. Two extreme cases, one of high and one of
luw transparency, called the subgraph information structure and the local informa-
tion structure, are analyzed in Spanjers et al. (1991a) and Spanjers et al. (1991b),
respectively. The analysis, however, is confined to economies in which the hierar-
chical structure can be represented by a directed graph with a tree structure and
one source. The economic consequence of this restriction is that none of the agents
can perform arbitrage. The existence theorems for equilibrium are proved under
very restrictive assumptiuns.
ln this paper we focus on hierarchically structured trade economies with local
iu(unnati~~n. 'l'he case uC subgraph iníormation is treated in Spanjers (1991b). In
our present paper the existence of equilibrium is proved fur economies in which there
are sufl~icient possibilities for arbitrage. Equivalence with Walrasian ecluilibrium
occurs if the equilibrium has uniform prices and the initial endowments of the set
of agents who have no leader are neglectible. We find that eyuilibrium allocations
need nut be l'aretu eíFicient and that, in eyuilibrium, agents that du not have a direct
leader in the hierarchical structure may find thenrselves being ratiuned. 7'hus in vur
2models with price setting agents the First Theorem of Welfare Economics rro longer
holds. [n uur stylised world the invisible hand may fail, even when it establishes
uniform prices.
The organization of the paper is as follows. A hierarchically structured trade
economy is defined in Section 2. The local information structure is described and
equilibrium in a hierarchically structured trade economy is defined. In Section 3
a theorem on the existence for equilibrium and a theorem which states that sorrre
agents ma,y be rationed in equilibrium are proved. In Section 4 we prove that
the Walrasian auctioneer may be replaced by a monopolist with neglectable initial
endowments. This result is then used to prove a theorem on Walrasian equivalence.
Some concluding remarks are made in Section 5.
2 The Model
In this section we define a hierarchically structured trade economy. We describe
such an economy by its hierarchical structure, by the individual characteristics of
its agents and by the institutional characteristics of its relations. The hierarchical
strrrcture describes between which pairs of agents a hierarchical relation exists and
which of the agents in a hierarchical relation dominates the other. Each individual
agent is described by his utility function and his initial endowments. Finally each
hierarchical relation is assumed to have the insitutional characteristics of a mo-
nopolistic relation between the dominating and the dominated agent. We explain
what we mean by an information structure which describes the transparency of the
ecorromy. We use the information structure to derive the conjectures oí the agents
about the consequences of their actions for the behaviour oí the other agents. The
conjectures of the agents are described by the anticipated trade correspondences.
'I'he actions an agent anticipates, for a given state of the economy, to lead to out-
conres that are feasible for him form his choice set. The correspondence which for
each state of the economy has the choice set as its image is called the choice cor-
respondence. Finally an equilibrium is defined to be a state which is (anticipated
to be) feasible for each agent is the economy, and which no agent anticipates to be
able to improve upon.
We describe the hierarchical structure of an economy by a directed graph which
3is callcd i t5 hierarchy graph.
Definition 2.1 A Hierarchy Graph, 9-L :- (A, D), is a weakly connected directed
simple finite graph.
'I'he definition of a hierarchy graph implies that for any two agents there exists a
chairr of relations which connects them. So they are (indirectly) connected within
the hierarchical structure.
For each agent i E A we define F; :- {j E A ~(i,j) E D}. 'I'he set I~ is the
set of the direct subordinates or followers of agent i in tlre hierarchy graph ~-l. We
define L; :- {h E A ~(h,i) E D} to denote the set of the direct superiors or leaders
of agent i in the hierarchy. Clearly L; tnay have more or less than one element.
Now we have defined a hierarchy graph we can define a hierarchically structured
trade economy or, simply, economy. We consider economies without production.
Definition 2.2 A Hierarchically Structured 1i~ade Economy is a tuple
E - ((A , D), {Uaiwa}aEA, {mOnw}wED) where:
l. (A, D) is a hierarchy graph.
,~. Ua : R.f~ R is the utility function of agent a which is defined over an 1-
dimensional commodity space. The utility function is assumed to be strictly
monotonic, continuous and strict quaai concave.
3. wa ~. R~~ denotes the initial endowments of agent a.
4. rnonw with w-(a, b) is a morropolistic trade relation between the agenta a
and b where agent a is the price setter and agent 6 is the price taker.
An econorny consists of a hierarchy graph which describes the social postion of
the agents in the economy, a set oí agents who have utility functions and initial
endowrnents as their individual characteristics, and a set of relations with their in-
situtiona] characteristics. Although we assume every hierarchical relation between
twu agents to have the institutional characteristics of a monopolistic relation be-
tween the leader and the follower, we mention this explicitly in the definition of a
hierarchically structured trade economy. The leader in a hierarchical relation sets
the prices for the trade on this relation. 'I'he prices for buying and selling are as-
sumed to be the same. The follower determines the amounts that are traded, the
4leader has the obligation to buy or sell whatever amount the follower decides to
trade at tlre given przces. This obligation may be disadvantageous for the leader r.
Our model oí a hierarchically structured trade economy should not be inter-
preted as a model of spatial econornics with a no-costs transportation technology.
Superimposing a hierarclrical structure on the economy does not change the loca-
tion of the goods in the economy in any way, it merely restricts the possibilities
to transfer ownership of the commodities. In a spatial model the same good at
different places may be represtented by different commodities in the corresponding
economy in the formulation of Debreu (1959). In our model, representing a good
"held" by different agents, by different commodities would amount to representing
a good owned b,y agent i by a different commodity as the same good held by a
different agent j. This, however, is something we do not want. Therefore superim-
posing a hierarchical structure on a set of agents does not (even implicitly) change
the set of commodities in the economy.
The trades, the pr~ces and the consumption bundles in the economy are de-
scribed by the trade-price-allocation system. We use X; :- Rrx~~' x Slr-r1x~F' to
denote the space of trades and prices agerrt i can choose from.
Definition 2.3 A Trade-Price-Allocation-System in the hierarchically struc-
tured trade econorrey E is a tuple (d, p, x) E X x R} ~A :- R'x~D ~ Sl~-rl x~t) x R!~~kA
where:
1, d~, E R~ denotes the trade in the relation (i,j) E D. We define d~ :- (d~h)hEL;.
,~, p;~ F .Sr-r is the price vector denotíTeg thc prices charged on the trade-relation
(i, j) E D. We define p; :- (p,~)~EF;.
,?. x, ~ ~i,t is the consum.ption bundle of agent i.
The prices a leader sets in a monopolistic trade relation depend on what he ex-
pects to be the consequences of setting these prices. Here the transparency of the
econorny becontes itnportant. One might assume an agent correctly anticipates the
cunsequences oí his actions Eor the behaviour of the agents of lower echelons in the
ecunorny, and that he assumes the actions of the remaining agents not tu be influ-
enced by his (change in) actions. This amounts to analyzing the subgame perfect
equilibria oí a hierarchically structured trade economy, where agents who are of
1This follows from Spanjers et al. (1991a, Example 4.1~.
5the highest hierarchical level move first, the agents of the second level move next
etc., if the corresponding game is well defined. The case where the hierarchy graph
has a tree structure and only has one source is analysed in Spanjers et al. (1991a).
For economies with a different class of hierarchical structures we refer to Span-
jers (1991b).
ln this paper we assume the economy is not sufficiently transparent to enable
each agent to have the conjectures of the consequences of his actions as described
above. We assume an agent, say i, knows the utility function of his direct followers,
knows their initial endowments, knows the aggregate of the trades between them
and their direct fulluwers in the current state of the econumy, and knuws the prices
their other leaders set for them. This specification of knowledge or information is
called the Local Information Structure. We assume agent i forms his conjec-
tures about the trades that result from a change in the prices he sets by solvíng the
optimization problem of his follower, say j, assuming the prices set by the other
leaders of agent j and the trades between agent j and his direct followers do not
change. The resulting conjectures of agent i about the consequences of a change in
the prices he sets for the behaviour of this follower j are described by the anticipated
trade correspondence of agent i for agent j E F;.
Definition 2.4 The Anticipated Trade Correspondence t;~ : X x X; ~ Ri
of agent i for j E F; for the local information structure is defined to be such that
if q;~ - p;~ then t;i((d,P),(e.~4í)) - d;; and iÍ9;i ~ p;~ then t;i((d,P),(e.,4t)) is the
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if this optimization problem has a solution.
If the optímization problem has no solution t;~((d, p), (e;, q;)) is defined to be the
value of e~; for the solutions of the above problem with the additional restriction that
7J~ t9 such that U;(yj) G iI~(y) :- Uj(xj) -~ ry where xj :- W; f~hEL, dih - ~jEF. dji
~~(y~)
Óis the consumptáon of agent j which results from (d, p), ry) 0 being "au,~ïciently
large" and U-i(U'(ry)) ~ Íb.
Here y is saád to 6e "su,~tciently large" áf one of the following holds for each
ry~ ry such that U-1(U~(y)) ~ 0:
1. ~y~ E R~ which results from an optimizàng trade of agent j and whích antic-
ipated by agent i to be attainable for him.
2. V ry~ ry: ~ y, E R~ whách is antácipated by agent i to be attainaóle for him,
and is such that U;(y;) ~ U;(x;).
It should be noted that in the above definitíon first ry is choosen such that it is
sufhciently large, and only then t;~ is constructed.
ln the case that for a follower j of an agent i it holds that L~ -{i}, the
anticipated trade correspondence of agent i for agent j for the local information
structure can be. represented by a continuous function Z. If agent j has more than
one leader things get more complicated.
In the case some agent j has, say, two leaders who set the same prices, agent j
is indifferent about which of the agents to trade with. This results in anticipated
trade correspondences for the leaders of agent j which have a hyperplane in R~ as
their itnage in the case the prices for trade with agent j are the same.
If the, say twu, leaders of agent j set different prices, then j will perform ar-
bitrage. Therefore the optimization problem which defines the anticipated trade
correspondence of agent i for agent j has no solution, since agent j will generate
a trade flow which is infinitly large in its absolute value. To prevent mathematical
difFiculties we define the anticipated trade flow in these cases to be "sufftciently
large" instead of infinitly large in absolute value. We say an anticipated trade flow
is sufficiently large if for agent i who provokes it one of the following holds.
l. '1'he anticipated trade ilow, ur auy such Aow which would make agent j still
better off, is large enough to make sure agent i can not deliver.
2. The anticipated trade flow is large enough to ensure that agent i can take
actians, given this anticipated trade flow, that make him better off than he
was before he induced the flow and that any higher utility level agent j may
aSee Spanjers et al. (1991b~.
7want to reach can be obtained by a trade flow which makes agent i still better
off.
The latter situation may arise if agent i can transfer the anticipated trade flow to
one of his leaders or another of his followers at profitable prices.
I)cs~iitc~ tlic~ diflic-icltiers ~nc~nti~~nccl :rhovc~ wc can a.nal,ytic hierarchically struc-turcd
trade econonues with the local infornration structure. The reason for this is that the
economies we analyse in this paper have rather particular hierarchical structures.
These structures are such that the agents effectively only use the strict monotonicity
of the utility fuctíons of their followers. In economies with a tree structure and
only one agent who does not have a(direct) superior in the hierarchical structure,
however, the agents need to know more about the utility functions of their followers
than that they are strictly monotonic 3.
'rhe set of actions agent i anticipates to be feasible is called the choice set of
agent i. Since it depends on the state of the economy as described by the trade-price
system and the anticipated trade correspondences of agent i with respect to this
followers, it would be more suitable but also more cumbersome to refer to it as the
set af. anticipated feasible actior.s ef agent i. The choice correspondence of agent i
is the correspondence that gives the choice set of agent i as a function of the trade-
price system. Once again the term anticipated feasible actions correspondence of
agent i would be more appropriate but still more cumbersome.
DeBnition 2.5 The Choice Correspondence B; : X~ X; x R~ of agent i ie
defined by:
13~(d, P) .- {(e~, 4., y:) E X; x R~ ~ eth ' Ph: C 0 ~l h E L,
and y; C w; ~ ~ e,h -~ ej~
hEL; jEF,
with ej. E t:j((d,P),(e.,9:)~}.
We assume each agent chooses his actions as to rnaximize his utility over his choice
set as it follows írorn the iníormation structure.
The eyuilibrium concept we use in this paper comes close to the concept of
conjectural eyuilibrium, and even closer to the concept of eyuilibrium with co-
3See Spanjers et al. (1991a,b).
Sordination of Vind (1983), as rnight be expected from the equivalence result of
Spanjers et al. (1991b, Theorem 3.4).
Definition 2.6 A trade-price-allocation-system (d', p', x') E X x Rt ~A is an
Equilibrium in the economy E if for each agent i E A:
1. (di~P:ix:) E Bi(d'iP')-
~. xí ~ ~i ~ ~hEL: dh - ~jEFc dji'
:1. (d~,P:,x;) ~ argrnax(~~,v.,v.)Ed:(d'.r') Ui(yi).
So an equilibrium tuple is a tuple of actions of the agents in the economy such that:
1. ,Anticipated FeasibilityJ The equilibrium tuple is anticipated to be feasible by
each agent in the economy.
2. (Actual FeasibilityJ The consumption bundle agent i anticipates to end up
with in equilibrium is attainable at equilibrium.
3. ~Slabilityf 'I'he equilibrium actiuns of each agent are maxitnal with respect
to the set of actions this agent anticipates to be feasible for the equilibriurn
trade-price-system.
It should be noted that in the present paper the condition of actual feasibility is
always satisfied if the two other equilibrium conditions hold. This is a consequence
oí the definition of the anticipated trade currespondences. In Spanjers et al. (1991a)
we have a different definition of the anticipated trade correspondences which is such
that anticipated feasibility and stability no longer imply actual feasibility.
In the construction of our model we followed an amended version of the methode
uí relatiunal modelling of Gilles and Ruys (1988). This method states that an
economic model should satisfy two main principles, the separation principle and
the interdependency principle. The separation principle states that the individual
characteristics and the social characteristics of (the agents in) the economy are
to be described separately. The interdependency principle states that, once the
individual and social characteristics of (the agents in) the economy are rnodelled
separately, the interaction between them must be described in order to properly
describe the behaviour of the agents.
9ín our nrodel we applied a cnucíified version of the separation principle in sepa-
rately describing the hierarchical structure, the agents and their individual charac-
teristics aud the hierarchical relations with their institutional characteristics. We
established the interdependence between the individual characteristics of the agents
and the institutional characteristics of the relations in the economy through the
conjectures of the agents. Therefore the interdependence principle for relational
modelling is also satisfied.
3 The Existence Theorem
In this section we pruve a theorem on the existence of equilibrium. As a corullary
we prove that in equilibrium some agents in Sr :- {i E A ~ L; ~~}, the set of
agents dat are not dominated in the hierarchícal structure, may be rationed.
For the case that ~Sl - 1 a theorem on the existence of equilibrium in an
econum,y in which the hierarchy graph has a tree structure and unly one source can
be proved under very restrictive conditions by using a fixed point theorem 4.
To begin with we prove a lemma which states that if two agents have the same
follower they will, in equilibrium, set the same prices for this follower. The intuition
is that if they du not, then their common follower could improve his allocation by
performing arbitrage between these two leaders.
We use P(a) :- ~{(b, a) E D} to denote the indegree of agent a in the hierarchy
graph 7-l. The indegree of a node in a directed graph is the number of ingoing arrows
of that node in the graph.
Lemrna 3.1 Suppose (d', p', x') is an equilibríum in E under local information.
Let c E A: P(c) ) 2. Then d k, I E L~ : pk~ - Pi~.
Proof
Let (d`, y`, x' ) be an equilibriurn in E. Let c E A such that P(c) ~'l. Suppuse
'Spanjers et al. (19916, Theorem 4.1).
10k, l E A with k~ l and pkc ~ pi~.
Since pk~, p~~ E int Sl-' there e~cist commodities, say r, 9 E{ 1, ...,1}, such that
~ ' pk~r ptn.
.
pkc~ ' plcs'
The optinuzation problem of agent c is
~x m~ ~-~ x F;xR'
Uc(~Jc)
(e~,qc,y~)ER xSl l ~ ~
such that
Phc ~ Cch C Q, ~ÍÍL E Iic.
y,. c~~ -I ~ ech ~, ~'j~,
hEL~ iEF~
mhere ei~ E tci((d~,P~),~e~,4~)).
Now ~(dckr, dck., d~t., d~t. ) E R4 such that e~, being d~ with d~ab replaced by d~ab
for a E {k, l} and 6 E {r, s}, is such that (e~, p~, y~) E B~(d', p') with y~ :- tv~ f
~hEt~ ech ~iEF e~,., and furthermore
. .
eckr ~- ectr ~ dekr ~ dr ~
. .
ecks } ecle - cks ~ cL'
The thus constructed trades d~ lead to a consumption bundle y~ which is weakly
larger than x~ which results from (d', p'). By the strict monotonicity of the pref-
erences of agent c this implies that y~ is preferred by c to x~. This contradicts
(d', p', x') being an equilibrium.
Q.E'.D.
11Lemma 3.2 Suppose ( d', p', x') is an equilibrium in E. Let a E A such that ~ k E
La. Let c E, Hà euch that b E L~, b~ a. Then pka - pa~ - p~.
Proof
By Lemma 3.1 it follows that pá~ - p~.





Choose p E S1-1 such that pt - pkat for all t E{1, ...,1} `{r, s} and
Pka~ - é~r ~ Pácr'
Pkas L P~ L Pau'
Define U'(ry) :- U~(x~) f ry with ry~ 0 and such that U-1(U'(ry)) ~ 0. The
optimization problem oí agent c which defines tac((d',p'),(e;,q;)) is
max Uc(yc)
(e~,y~)ER~x~L~xR~ ~uch that U~(yc)GU'(7)
such that
Pi,~ ' ech c 0 , d h E L~.
yc ~ Wc ~- ~ e~h - ~ d~~.
hEL~ jEF~





and e~at - d~at for all other commodities. This implies agent c is assumed to make
all other changes in his consumption through his trade with agent b.
Furthermore there exist trades ea such that for eak we have that
eak~ f~ eear
eakn ' ecas
J ' dakr } car
. .
- dak~ } cas
and eahi :-- dQht if either h E La `{k} or t E {1,...,1} `{r,s}. Clearly (ca,pa,ya) E
~a(d',p') íU[' ya .- (~1a {~hELn eah -~ LiEFe`{~) d~a - e~a. The resulting consumption
bundle ya for agent a is weakly larger than the bundle xá and is therefure preferred
hy a to xn. 'Phis cuntradicts (d', p', x') being an equilibrium.
1'lQ.E.D.
9
Lemma 3.3 Suppoae (d', p', x') is an equilibrium in E. Let a E A, let b, c E Fn, b~
. . . - p.
c. Suppoae a~ f E L6 and a y` g E L~. Then p~b - pnb - pn~ e~.
Proof
By Lemma 3.1 it holds that pjy - páb and pá~ - pD~.





liefine yy, y~ such that qb -- 9; - p; far i E { 1, ..., l} `{T, 9} aIld qT, 9;, 9., i~ SllC1S
i
that
pr i 9r J 9r 1 pr .
p, C 4; L 4; C P,'




if (i,j) E D`{(f,b),(a,b),(a,c),(g,c)}.
if (i,7) E {(Ï,6),(a~b),(a,c),(9,c)}.
Now there exist éyf, éyn, é~a, é~D, induced by some ry sufficiently large, such that for
the allocation y, which results from e such that for each a E A we have that
yn .- ~n }~.hEL, enh - Z.jEF. eia, it holds that
U6(yb) i U6(x6)'
U~(y~) 7 U r ~(x~)'
Un(yn) ~ Vn(xa)'
Eiy thc definition oí tnb((d', p'), (en, 9n)) , tn~((d', P'), (en, 4n)) and 13n(d', p') it fol-
luws that (en,9n,yn) E ~n(d~~P.)'
[3ut this cuntradic.ts (d',p',x') being an equilibrium.
Q.ï.D.
13Lemma 3. I, Lemn~a 3.2 and Lernma 3.3 enable us to pruve a theorem on thc ex-
istence of equilibrium in hierarchically structured trade ecunumies. '1'he intuition
behind the existence theorem is that if there are enough possibilities íor arbitrage
in the economy and if there is a uniform price which leads to a total net demand
from the agents from A` Sl such that the agents from Sl can meet this total net
demand, then this uniform price is an equilibrium price. The reason for this is that
nu singlc, agent dares to deviate írom the uniform price since he anticipates such a
deviation to result in arbitrage which is disadvantageous for him.
Theorexn 3.4 ~Existence Theorem~
Let i{ -(A,D) 6e a híerarchy graph. Define Sl :- {a E A ~P (a) - 0}. Suppose
d c E A`Sr : P (c) 7 2. Now there exista a uniform price equilibrium in the economy
E which has ~{ aa its hierarchy graph. Furthermore every equilibrium ín E is an
uniform price equilibrium.
Proof
Lct p E Si-' be the Walrasian equilibrium price for the market consisting of the
agents A. By the assumptions on the individual characteristics of the agents the
sorne Walrasian equilibrium (p, x' ) exists for the market consisting oí the agents A.
Let the trades d' be such that the corresponding Walrasian allocations x' result.
Clearly (d',p',x' ) with p' :- (p)wEn is feasible. It remains to show it is stable.
Suppose ~6 E.1 `{Sl} : 3(eb,qb,yb) E B6(d',p') such that the resulting consump-
tion bundle for agent b, yb :- u~6f~hEL~ eóh-~jEF, ejb `vlth ejb E tbj((d''p')' (eb'96))'
is preferred to xb by him.
This implies that qb ~ pb. So 3 c E F6 : q~ ~ p'. So there exist commodities





Arbitrage by agent c with another of his leaders inclines agent b to anticipate
e~, - dr G 0.
e~, - d; 1 0.
For the profits from trade for agent 6 with respect to agent c, this means that
(qe~r - Pr)(e~ -- d~,,.) } (4~e. - P.)(e~b, - d~.) G 0.
This implies that the value of the consumption yb, at given prices p, is less than
that ~~f thr. bunclle xb, thercfure yh is wurse for agent b than xb.
Suppusc~ I h ~- Si : 1(qb, yb) t Bb(d', p') such that the resulting cunsuutptiun bun-
dle for agent b, yb :- ~6 - ~~EF~ e~b with e~b E tb~((d',p'),(qb)), is preferred to xb
by him.
Once again this implies that qb ~ pb. So ~ c E Fb : qy~ ~ p. By the same line
of reasoning as before it follows that for e~, induced by y sufftciently large, this
n~snlts in :~ c~~nsn~uptic~n bunclic fur aKcnt h such that ,y~, ~J R.c~ which contraclïcts
(96,yb) E~. I16(d',p').
Therefore (p)wEV is a uniform price equilibriwn in E.
Furthermore suppose p' is not an uniform price system. Now une of the following
three cases holds:
Caae 1.
l a E A: 3 b, c E La : p~ ~ p~. This contradicts Lemma 3.1.
Caae ,~.
3 a, 6, c, k E A as in Lemma 32 with pka ~ pa~ - p~. This obviously contradicts
Lemma 3.'l.
Caee 3.
3 a E A: ~ b, c E Fa as in Lemma 3.3 and pQb ~ p;~. This contradicts Lemma 3.3.
Q.L.D.
Theorem 3.4 shows that even if the individual agents in the economy know al-
must nothing about the economy they participate in, equilbriurn still exists. 'Che
weak point, of course, is that this theorem dues not give any indication uf huw this
15equilibrium could be attained. To attain an equilibrium, actions between agents
who may not even know about each others existence have to be co-ordinated, one
way or another.
It should be noted that by the line of proof of Theorem 3.4 only shows that the
Walrasian equilibrium is one of the possibly many equilibria of this economy. This
implies the Second Theorem of Welfare Economics holds under the assumptions
of the theorem. However, not every equilibrium need to be Pareto efficient. For
instance, if there are at least two agents in Sr who have initial endowments that are
not zero, then there exist equilibria with the Walrasian equilibrium prices in which
all agents except the agents in Sr end up with the Walrasian allocations. This may
happen because there is no way for the agents in Sr to co-ordinate their trades in
such a way that they too end up with their Walrasian allocations. This is example
also indicates there may be a continuum of equilibrium allocations.
Another example of an equilibrium which is not Pareto efficient is the following.
Suppose ~ a E Sr : wa ~ 0. Now the monopoly price of agent a for the mazket
cunsisting of the agents of A`{a} is also an equilibrium price. Summarizing we
cunclude that our specification of price setting behaviour and arbitrage destroys
the First Theorem of Welfare Economics for the economies under consideration.
In fact, one may interpret these examples as examples in which the agents in Sl
that do nut end up with their "price taking" consumption bundles for the uniform
price p' are being rationed in equilibrium. Because they are obliged to meet the
trades of their direct followers they end up with a consumption bundle which differ
Irorn the best bundle at prices p', which is the "price taking" bundle at pryces p'.
This is forrnalized by the following corollary.
Cvrollar,y 3.5 [Kationing in Equilibrium]
Let E be ae in Theorem 3.4 and aaaume ~Sr ~`l. Now a tuple (d',p',:r') is an
equilibrium if and only if the following holde:
1. ~p E S'-r euch that p' :- (p)wED~
,~. di E A`Sr the conaurnption bundle xi ia the optimal conaumption of a price
taking agcnt i at price.~ p.
3, t1 i F S~ we have, lhat x~ r~ It{. and p - x~ - p-~;.
,~. Thc tradce d' are auch thal t1 i E. A we have that x' -- c.i;-{-~hEL; d;n ~.iEh; di~.
16Proof
The pruof uf this statement fulluws the line of proof of Theorem 3.4 and uses the
definition of equilibrium and the strict monotonicity of the utility functions of the
agentsin E.
Q.~.D.
4 The Equilvalence Theorem
[n this section we prove a theorem on Walrasian equivalence. In order to do so
we first pruve that the Walrasian auctioneer is equivalent to a monopolist with
neglectahle initial endowments. To be more precise, we show that the Walrasian
auctiuner.r is eyuilvalent tu a monupolist with initial enduwments that eyual zero
and whu is furced to set the same prices for all his followers. This theorem is in-
spired by Gilles (1989, Theorem 4.3).
Consider the set of agents A:- {0,1, ..., n} with strict quasi-concave, stricly
munotonic, and continuous utility functions. We take the agents a E{ 1, ..., n,} to
be price-taking cunsurners with initial endowments wo E K~. Agent 0 is assumed tu
have initial endowments wo - 0. Agent 0 sets the prices in the economy and we as-
sume he cannot discriminate in the prices for the other consumers in the economy.
Since the agents in the trade ecunumy have strictly monotonic utility functions,
there exists sonte E~ 0 such that without loss of generality we can restrict the set
of priccs tu S~-1





~a - wo f da.
17This is the familiar optimization problem for a price-taking consumer. We define
ta : S~-' -~ Rt to be a function that for each p E S~-1 we have that ta(p) is the trade
da that is belongs to the solution of the above maximization problem for prices p.





xo ~ 0 - ~ áa(P).
a-1
Theorern 4.1 ~Walrasian MonopulistJ
Any equiliórium in the trade economy E corresponds to a 4b'alrasian equiliórium in
the pure exchange economy É- {Ua,l~7a}aEA and vice versa.
Proof
Only if
I~et (x', p') be an equilibrium in the trade economy E.
Furthermure let a ~ {1, . . . , n}.
(Given the optinuzation problem of agent a it follows that the trades ta(p) of agent a
will be the "Walrasian trade" of a price-taking consumer. So it remains to be shown
t}~at if (x', p' ) is an equilibrium in the trade economy E, then p' is a Walrasian
e~(nilibriuni price. Fur in the case p' is an Walrasian eynilibriurn priccs the trades
of agent a E{1,...,n} with agent 0 as specified above just are the (net) Lrades uf
agent a on the Walrasian market.
Tlie inequality p- ta(p) L 0 for every a E{1, ..., n} implies that
n
P ~ (~ ta(P)) C 0.
a .- t
From p E S~-' and xo ~~ wo -~;á-~ ta(p) for xo E R~ it follows that ~a-1 ta(p) ~ 0.
'I'herefore we have for each p Ë S~-1 that
18n
~ ta(P) - 0.
a-:
Consequently we have that xo - 0. So the Walrasian equilibrium conditions hold
íor the exchange economy É.
If
Let (x',p') be a Walrasian equilibrium in the exchange economy É, where x de-
notes the allocation. Clearly x', with xó - 0, is attainable for every agent in the
trade economy E.
Suppose (x',p') is not an equilibrium in E.
Then there exists a price p and an allocation i such that (x,p) is attainable for
every agent a E A and Uo(x) ~ Uo(0). Because of the strict monotonicity of the
utility function of agent 0 this implies that ï~ 0. Now p E S~-I implies that:
n
P' (~ ta(P)) C 0.
a-:
On the other hand the budget condition and the strict monotonicity of the utility
function (or cvery a E{1,...,n} in:plics
P' ta(P) - 0.
Therefore
n
~ P ~ ta(P) - ~~
a-1




This contradicts p~(~a-~ ta(p)) c 0.
'I'herefore (x',p') is an eyuilibrium in E.
Q.E.D.
To end this section we prove a theorem on the equivalence of equilibrium in a
hierarchic:ally structured trade economy with Walrasian equilibriurn. It states that
if the agents of S, have neglectible initia.l endowments in an econumy with a local
19information structure and with sufficient possibilities for arbitrage, then every equi-
libriunt in the hierarchically structured trade economy is a Walrasian equilibrium
and vice versa. Note that this in particular is the case if Sl -(D.
Theorem 4.2 [Walrasian EquivalenceJ
hcl E bc a.~ in Theorem .Y.4. Aaaume additionally that tía E Sl :~a - 0, which ie
equivalent to a~~uminy ~;at5, wa - 0. Then p' ie an (uniform~ equilibrium price for
E if and only if it ia a Walraaian equilibrium price in E. Furthermore the equilibrium
allocationa in E for p' are the Walraeian allocationa for p' and vice verea.
Proof
Caae 1. Sl ~ 0.
'I'he statr.rnrnt folliiws directly from Theorem 3.4 and Theorem 4.1.
Caee 2. S~ -- ~.
Every Walrasian equilibrium is an equilibrium in the economy E by the proof of
Theorem 3.4.
Let (d', p',x' ) be an equilibrium in E. By Theorem 3.4 it follows that it is a uniform
price equilibrium. So no agent can gain additional income from his position as an
intermediary. Therefore every agent solves the problem of maximizing his utility
given his initial endowments and the equilibrim prices as set for him by his direct
leaders. But this implies the equilibrium is a Walrasian equilibrium.
Q.f..D.
`I'he Walrasian Equivalence of Theorem 4.2 is attained by assuming the initial
euduwments of the agents in Sl to be such that the equilibrium condition of fea-
sibility "solves" the coordination problem of those agents. There is, however, an-
other way to solve this coordination problem. The definition of the anticipated
trade correspondences may be changed by dropping the condition "if q;~ - p,~ then
'l0t;~((d, p), (e;, q;)) - d~;". In this case we find that the equilibrium condition of sta-
bility in the economy E"solves" the coordination problem, because for each uniform
price system the optimization problem of each agent in Sl is solved by trades that
yield him his Walrasian allocation for the given price vector. So any tuple that does
not give each agent in Sl his Walrasian allocation for the equilibrium price system
does not satisfy the equilibrium condition of stability and therefore is no longer an
eyuilibrium.
5 Conclusions
'1'he aim of this paper was to enrich the general equilibrium model of an exchange
economy with price setting agents by making use of a hierarchical structure on the
set of agents of the economy. We incorporated a notion of arbitrage in our models.
In Sr.ction 2 we defined a hierarchically structured trade economy. We assumed
agents to be embedded in a hierarchical structure. A hierarchical relation between
two agents was assumed to have the institutional form of a monopolistic relation,
i.e. the dominating agent acts as a price setter, the dominated agent acts as a
price taker with respect to this relation. We described what the local information
st.ructure is and how the conjectures of the agents are derived from the model
of the economy for this specific information structure. Finally equilibrium in a
hierarchically structured trade economy was defined.
A theorem on the existence of equilbrium was proved in Section 3. Furthermure
it was shown that our models allow for agents in Sl, the set of agents who do not
have auy direct leaders in the hierarchical structure, to be rationed in equilibrium.
In Section 4 a Lheorem was proved which shows that the Walrasian auctioneer can
be replaced by a Walrasian monopolist who has to set a uniform price for the whole
market and who has neglectible initial endowments. This result was used to prove
a theorem on Walrasian equivalence.
[u thc ~nudels uf Section 3 we found that even if an equilibriuni with uniform
prices exists in the hierarchically structured trade economy, Lhis by n~~ rneans ini-
plies these equilibria Lo result in Walrasian allucatiuns. It was argued that adcíiug
monopolistic price setting to a pure exchange economy may lead to equilibria which
are not Pareto efficient. Furthermore we also found that in equilibrium some agents
tnay be rationcd. Therefore in our stylized world with price setting agents the in-
21visible hand may fail.
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